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INTRODUCTION 
Wage theft is a simple idea: an employer steals an employee’s 
wages.1  In the early 2000s, advocates in the United States first 
deployed this term to frame employers’ failure to comply with wage 
and hour laws not merely as noncompliance, but as real theft, akin to 
what attorneys general (AGs) and district attorneys (DAs) prosecute 
every day.2  Historically, though, wage theft in the United States has 
been addressed exclusively by government agencies charged with 
enforcing these labor laws3 — typically departments of labor — or by 
workers bringing civil actions.4  These traditional enforcement tools, 
however, have failed to contain the wage theft epidemic,5 which costs 
workers and society around $15 billion each year.6  So how can 
workers find relief? 
In the United States and most other countries, a labor inspectorate 
is the primary mechanism to ensure employer compliance with labor 
 
 1. For a description of the manifold strategies by which employers steal workers’ 
wages, see KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING 
AMERICANS ARE NOT GETTING PAID — AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 23–41 
(2014) (including paying below the minimum wage, not compensating for all hours 
worked, paying checks with insufficient funds, not paying or misclassifying workers as 
“exempt” from overtime, or simply not paying people at all). 
 2. César F. Rosado Marzán identifies 2005 as the year when advocates began to 
use the term to call attention to this practice. See César F. Rosado Marzán, Wage 
Theft as Crime: An Institutional View, 20 J.L. SOC’Y 300, 302 (2020) [hereinafter 
Rosado Marzán, Wage Theft as Crime]. Kim Bobo’s 2009 book is recognized as the 
first mainstream use of the term. See Nicole Hallett, The Problem of Wage Theft, 37 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 98 n.21 (2018). But see Sarah Green, Wage Theft as a 
Legal Concept, in CRIMINALITY AT WORK 134, 134 (Alan Bogg et al. eds., 2020) 
(arguing why this practice does not constitute theft). 
 3. This Note will employ the term “labor law” to encompass the range of laws 
regulating the U.S. workplace and employment standards, unless specified otherwise. 
 4. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which governs wage and hour laws at 
the federal level, provides employees a right to bring federal claims under the Act. 
See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the Department of 
Labor (DOL) enforces the FLSA. See Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/youthlabor/enforcement [https://perma.cc/4FGC-
YJW7] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020). 
 5. See Jennifer J. Lee & Annie Smith, Regulating Wage Theft, 94 WASH. L. REV. 
759, 769 (2019) (“Most government agencies responsible for enforcement allow 
employers to act with impunity by failing to adequately enforce existing wage and 
hour laws. The agencies may lack motivation or resources to enforce the law. A 2018 
investigation found that six states lacked a single investigator to investigate minimum 
wage violations.” (citations omitted)); see also DAVID COOPER & TERESA KROEGER, 
ECON. POL’Y INST., EMPLOYERS STEAL BILLIONS FROM WORKERS’ PAYCHECKS EACH 
YEAR 5–6 (2017), https://files.epi.org/pdf/125116.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YDM-8KFR] 
(describing declining numbers of inspectors and how few workers are able to bring 
private claims and what percentage of them ultimately receive any restitution). 
 6. See COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 1. 
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laws.7  Labor inspectorates struggle to do just that, particularly in low-
wage industries.8  This “enforcement gap” is well-documented: for 
decades, scholars have analyzed different inspectorate regimes 
throughout the world, identified failures and best practices, and 
proposed ways to reorganize inspectorates to better enforce the law.9  
By building on their work, this Note focuses explicitly on how the 
U.S. enforcement system has failed to address the epidemic of wage 
theft, particularly for low-wage workers. 
To analyze the United States’s enforcement gap, this Note will 
review some of the scholarly proposals to restructure inspectorate 
operations.  It does not seek to solve the particular challenges that the 
U.S. inspection regime faces or even to address them in a 
comprehensive way.  Rather, by acknowledging both the immensity 
of requisite reforms and the foreseeable political inability of achieving 
them, this Note advocates for a specific intervention in certain 
circumstances to enforce bad actor employers who steal from their 
workers. 
Analysis of inspectorates shows that, absent profound policy 
change, the U.S. inspectorate lacks the most punitive enforcement 
techniques that other countries’ inspectors use to compel compliance 
— large monetary fines, license suspension or revocation, or jail 
 
 7. See INT’L LAB. OFF., LABOUR INSPECTION: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT DOES 8, 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_dialogue/—-
lab_admin/documents/instructionalmaterial/wcms_141403.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/REJ6-J9XW] (last visited Mar. 14, 2021) (“National governments 
adopt legislation and policies that promote decent working conditions, in 
consultation with employers’ and workers’ organizations and they appoint [labor 
inspectorates] to supervise the proper application of such legislation and policies and 
to promote their compliance.”). 
 8. See infra Section I.B. For a global overview of struggles facing inspectorates, 
see generally ILO Comm. on Emp. & Soc. Pol’y, Strategies and Practice for Labour 
Inspection, GB.297/ESP/3 (Nov. 2006). Scholars define “low-wage work” differently. 
This Note will define low-wage workers as those who earn less than two-third of the 
median full-time wage in a particular location. See Low-Wage Work in California, 
U.C. BERKELEY LAB. CTR., https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/low-wage-work-in-
california/#the-numbers [https://perma.cc/5NNF-LH39] (last visited Nov. 8, 2020). 
Other scholars define low-wage work as what would be necessary to lift a family of 
four above the poverty threshold. See, e.g., LAWRENCE MISHEL, JARED BERNSTEIN & 
SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2006/2007 (2007); see also 
Janice Fine, Solving the Problem from Hell: Tripartism as a Strategy for Addressing 
Labour Standards Non-Compliance in the United States, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 813, 
814 n.1 (2013). 
 9. See generally INT’L LAB. OFF., LABOUR ADMINISTRATION AND LABOUR 
INSPECTION (2011). 
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time.10  In the U.S. system, however, other enforcement agents do 
hold these tools, namely AGs and DAs.11  In recent years, these law 
enforcement lawyers have begun to prosecute bad-actor employers 
who steal from and otherwise exploit and endanger their workers, 
recovering millions of dollars in stolen wages for workers and 
exacting large fines from employers.12  This Note argues that this 
work should be expanded under specific conditions that safeguard 
workers’ interests and ensure more effective prosecutions. 
Some worker advocates have recognized the utility of this 
intervention from a complementary perspective: in the current 
enforcement gap, responsible criminal law enforcement is a helpful 
intervention; prosecutors are one of many actors who can hold law-
breaking employers accountable.13  This Note will argue, however, 
that the intervention of DAs and AGs is necessary, not merely 
complementary, in the current U.S. system.  Because U.S. inspectors 
do not possess the punitive tools required to enforce employers who 
willfully break the law, they cannot effectively hold accountable bad 
actor employers who steal from their employees, absent profound 
policy change.  To fill this structural enforcement gap, DAs and AGs 
should enter the breach.  This Note will describe not only the benefits 
 
 10. See Kiran Mirchandani & Sheldon Matthew Bromfield, Roundabout Wage 
Theft: The Limits of Regulatory Protections for Ontario Workers in Precarious Jobs, 
22 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 661, 664 (2019) (“Overall, in the United States, Canada, Australia, 
and Britain, the enforcement of labor laws and policies is weak and lacks strong 
deterrent penalties for wage theft of all forms . . . .”). Chilean inspectors, for example, 
have the ability to issue very large fines for a variety of penalties and suspend work or 
close a workplace. See César F. Rosado Marzán, Punishment and Work Law 
Compliance: Lessons from Chile, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 343, 365, 378–86 
(2012) [hereinafter Rosado Marzán, Punishment and Work Law Compliance]; see 
also Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement 
Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 562 (2011) 
(arguing that “license revocation must be a meaningful possibility”); Hallett, supra 
note 2, at 115 (describing how, in the absence of federal-level tools, states and 
municipalities have begun to experiment with licensing schemes and other penalties). 
For further discussion, see infra Section I.B. 
 11. See infra Section II.C. 
 12. See infra Section II.C. 
 13. See, e.g., Arisha Hatch & Terri Gerstein, Representing the People, STAN. 
SOC. INNOVATION REV., Winter 2020, https://ssir.org/articles/entry/
re_envisioning_the_roles_of_prosecutors_and_attorneys_general_to_make_the_justic
e_system_work_for_everyone# [https://perma.cc/47LP-U42R]; Daniel J. Galvin, 
Deterring Wage-Theft: Alt-Labor, State Politics, and the Policy Determinants of 
Minimum Wage Compliance, 14 PERSPS. ON POL. 324, 325 (2016) (reviewing 
advocates’ championing of criminal penalties as part of an “everything but the 
kitchen sink” strategy to address wage theft at the state-level); Rosado Marzán, Wage 
Theft as Crime, supra note 2, at 306–07 (arguing that criminalization of wage theft 
can help fill the gap created by insufficient enforcement agencies and private claims). 
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and drawbacks of encouraging DAs and AGs to enforce labor laws 
but also the ideal or necessary circumstances for law enforcement 
lawyers to wield these powers in favor of workers, particularly 
undocumented workers. 
Part I outlines what wage theft is and why the U.S. inspectorate is 
unable to curtail it.  By examining employers’ economic motivations 
for complying with wage and hour law, Part II reviews two primary 
ways to increase compliance: raising the likelihood of getting caught 
and increasing the penalties for unlawful behavior.  Because this Note 
does not propose sweeping federal policy changes,14 Part II will 
identify one of the interventions15 that is working to address low-wage 
worker exploitation: DAs and AGs using their criminal enforcement 
powers to hold accountable bad-actor employers.  Part III will both 
review the challenges this model faces and propose best practices to 
safeguard the rights of workers and ensure more successful outcomes 
for these cases. 
I. U.S. INSPECTORATE’S FAILURE TO ENFORCE LABOR LAWS 
A. What Is Wage Theft? 
While labor law violations come in many flavors — that often exist 
together in workplaces16 — this Note focuses on wage theft as a lens 
to analyze enforcement failures and opportunities.  Wage theft can 
 
 14. Congress indeed has the ability to allocate significantly more resources to 
labor inspection and to enable much stiffer penalties. Over the course of the last half 
century, however, we have witnessed the opposite: inspector levels have declined 
while numbers of workplaces have grown significantly. See Fine & Gordon, supra 
note 10, at 554 (describing expanding numbers of employees and employers and 
falling numbers of inspectors); see also Galvin, supra note 13, at 327 (demonstrating 
that the likelihood of getting investigated was between 0.5% and 1%). In addition to 
the low likelihood of getting investigated, civil money penalties have remained 
stubbornly low: maximum penalties for willful violations of wage and hour laws are 
$1,100, adjusted annually for inflation to $2,074 in 2021. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(e)(2); 
Civil Money Penalty Inflation Adjustments, U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/resources/penalties [https://perma.cc/96AP-MKSC] 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2021). While they are highly unlikely, this Author would 
welcome Congress to make dramatic improvements to U.S. labor law enforcement. 
 15. For a survey of other anti-wage theft strategies being implemented at the state 
level, see generally Lee & Smith, supra note 5; Hallett, supra note 2; Galvin, supra 
note 13. 
 16. See MICHAEL J. PIORE & ANDREW SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION: 
PROTECTING WORK AND WORKERS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 37 (2018) 
[hereinafter PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION] (In the United States, 
“the same employers often violate multiple laws and nonetheless limit their liability 
to the particular violations discovered by specialist inspectors with narrow 
jurisdictions and training”). 
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take many forms, but it consists of more than an inadvertent payroll 
mistake.17  Broadly speaking, employers steal workers’ wages by: “(1) 
paying less than the minimum, promised, or overtime wage; (2) taking 
unauthorized deductions from a worker’s pay; or (3) failing to pay for 
all hours worked.”18  Even if workers know their rights, employers 
sometimes use sophisticated techniques to fool employees including: 
“time-shaving,” where managers alter time cards by small amounts on 
different days; requiring workers to clock out and keep working or to 
arrive early to start working before clocking in; or compelling workers 
to do preparatory tasks off the clock, like sharpening knives or 
changing into protective gear.19  Employers also intentionally 
misclassify workers as independent contractors to avoid minimum 
wage and overtime regulations, mandatory employer benefit 
contributions, tax payments, and more.20 
Wage theft costs U.S. workers billions of dollars per year.  A 2017 
study estimated that in the ten most populous U.S. states, workers 
lose around $8 billion to wages stolen by employers.21  Extrapolating 
these numbers across all 50 states, the total wages stolen from 
workers each year exceeds $15 billion in the United States.22  By way 
of comparison, all other property theft in 2017 amounted to $16.4 
billion.23  The collateral consequences of wage theft extend 
throughout society, increasing workers’ and families’ reliance on 
public assistance programs and costing the government — federal, 
state, and local — millions of dollars in lost tax revenue each year.24  
Critically, the impact of wage theft falls most heavily on low-wage 
workers25 who already face significant economic and workplace 
 
 17. See supra note 1. 
 18. Lee & Smith, supra note 5, at 765 (internal citations omitted). 
 19. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-
REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 62–63 (2010). 
 20. See FRANÇOISE CARRÉ, ECON. POL’Y INST., (IN)DEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
MISCLASSIFICATION 2 (2015). 
 21. See COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 1. 
 22. See id. at 2. 
 23. See Luke Darby, Is Your Employer Stealing from You?, GQ (Nov. 8, 2019), 
https://www.gq.com/story/wage-theft [https://perma.cc/72RM-GMLN] (quoting a 
statistic from the Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
 24. See COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 28 (describing not only lost income 
tax revenue but also lost sales tax revenue from the stolen income that workers could 
not spend). 
 25. See id. at 8–9 (noting that significant, pervasive violations of core workplace 
laws occur in many low-wage industries and that women, immigrants, and people of 
color are disproportionately affected by workplace violations). 
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struggles.26  Despite recent scholarly interest in wage theft, very little 
is known about the full extent of the problem.27 
Why do employers fail to comply with wage and hour laws?  Quite 
simply, noncompliance pays: the economic incentives of 
noncompliance are much too large compared with the likelihood of 
inspection and expected punishment.28  David Weil’s study of the Los 
Angeles apparel industry found that — factoring in the likelihood of 
inspection and median civil penalty if caught — an employer in 2002 
stood to make roughly $11,000 more per worker annually by choosing 
noncompliance over compliance.29  If enforcement actions occur at all 
in the United States, they typically only secure a portion of back 
wages owed.30  While more inspections would change the equation, 
insofar as unscrupulous employers would have a higher likelihood of 
being discovered, the level of available punishment remains 
insufficient to outweigh the employer’s cost savings.31 
B. The Broken U.S. Inspectorate 
Labor laws traditionally are enforced by labor inspectors who 
deploy a range of tools to ensure compliance with the law.  How 
inspectors do and should work is a topic of significant scholarly 
analysis.  Setting aside questions of resources — how much money a 
 
 26. See Steven Bittle & Laureen Snider, How Employers Steal from Employees: 
The Untold Story, 45 SOC. JUST. 119, 137 (2018) (listing struggles that include “the 
paucity of their choices and avenues for recourse, the precariousness of their 
employment, the underenforcement of employment standards, the advent of 
electronic timekeeping, the absence of union representation to support their claims of 
unpaid wages, and, for undocumented immigrant workers, the threat of deportation” 
(citation omitted)). 
 27. See Galvin, supra note 13, at 327. 
 28. See David Weil, Compliance with the Minimum Wage: Can Government 
Make a Difference? 9–10 (Jan. 6, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Weil, 
Compliance with the Minimum Wage], 
https://hctar.seas.harvard.edu/files/hctar/files/hr05.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2QW-
DZXP]; see also NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: AN ADVOCATE’S 
GUIDE TO STATE AND CITY POLICIES TO FIGHT WAGE THEFT 17 (2011), 
https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/WinningWageJustice2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R4PA-23JW]. 
 29. See Weil, Compliance with the Minimum Wage, supra note 28, at 10. 
 30. See ESTLUND, supra note 19, at 60. The FLSA allows workers to collect two 
years of prior wages or three for “willful violations.” See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 
 31. See Weil, Compliance with the Minimum Wage, supra note 28, at 10; see also 
Annette Bernhardt, Michael W. Spiller & Diana Polson, All Work and No Pay: 
Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in Chicago, Los Angeles and New York 
City, 91 SOC. FORCES 725, 728 (2013) (“[I]n the absence of strong penalties and 
enforcement, compliance with workplace laws is best understood as one specific form 
of employers’ decision making about labor costs . . . .”); infra Section II.A. 
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government allocates to this work — countries have configured and 
equipped their inspectorates in two general ways: compliance or 
deterrence.32  In countries that follow a compliance approach, 
inspectors have broad purview over the labor code and tend to deploy 
pedagogical strategies that encourage or educate employers, as 
opposed to punishing them.33  By contrast, in the United States and 
other countries that adhere to a deterrence or “command-and-
control” framework, labor inspectors primarily use punitive tools, like 
fines, to dissuade employers from breaking the law.34  While legal 
scholars debate the comparative effectiveness of compliance and 
deterrence approaches, these two models are premised on 
fundamentally different assumptions about the causes of labor 
violations.35  Under compliance theory, employers may be ignorant or 
incompetent but generally do not intentionally contravene the law.36  
In contrast, deterrence theory is based on the idea that a substantial 
 
 32. See, e.g., PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 5–
8; Leah F. Vosko et al., The Compliance Model of Employment Standards 
Enforcement: An Evidence-Based Assessment of Its Efficacy in Instances of Wage 
Theft, 48 INDUS. REL. J. 256, 256–57 (2017); JOHN HOWE, TESS HARDY & SEAN 
COONEY, CTR. FOR EMP. & LAB. REL. L., TRANSFORMATION OF ENFORCEMENT OF 
MINIMUM EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT IN AUSTRALIA 59–60, 
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/1556738/FWOReport-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YSY-AH8R] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021). Some 
countries blend the two models with some success. Brazil and Chile are two particular 
examples. See Renato Bignami & Mari Cristina Serrano Barbosa, Labor Inspection 
and Wage Theft in Brazil: Justice at the Street Level, Social Peace, and 
Development, 37 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 267, 279 (2016); see also Roberto Pires, 
Promoting Sustainable Compliance: Styles of Labour Inspection and Compliance 
Outcomes in Brazil, 147 INT’L LAB. REV. 199, 200 (2008) (showing examples of how 
Brazilian inspectors fashion innovative approaches using their wide discretion in a 
“sustainable compliance” framework that combines punitive and pedagogical 
approaches); Rosado Marzán, Punishment and Work Law Compliance, supra note 
10, at 364–72 (describing the Chilean inspector’s wide discretion to levy large fines 
and other punishments or replace fines with training or alternative compliance 
programs). 
 33. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 5–6. 
France is the classic model for a compliance-based inspectorate. See, e.g., Marc 
Vericel, The Labor Inspectorate in France and the Protection of Wages, 37 COMPAR. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 299 (2016). Notably, in France, employers are required to carry 
wage insurance to allow employees to collect back wages even where an employer 
claims insolvency. See Janice Fine, The Franco-Iberian Model from the U.S. 
Perspective, 37 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y 397, 400–02 (2016). 
 34. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 5–6; see 
also Michael J. Piore & Andrew Schrank, Toward Managed Flexibility: The Revival 
of Labour Inspection in the Latin World, 147 INT’L LAB. REV. 1, 5 (2008) [hereinafter 
Piore & Schrank, Toward Managed Flexibility]. 
 35. See Vosko et al., supra note 32, at 259. 
 36. See id. 
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proportion of employers who violate labor laws, including wage and 
hour law, have determined they are better off by not complying.37  To 
effectively deter law-breaking employers, inspectors must raise the 
risk of being caught and/or increase the penalties for breaking the 
law.38 
Apart from using primarily punitive tools, U.S. inspectors are 
specialists who enforce a narrow portion of the labor code, as 
opposed to generalists who inspect for violations across the labor 
code.39  The U.S. enforcement regime is divided horizontally between 
various federal agencies and vertically between federal and state 
agencies.40  Different federal agencies and their inspectors are tasked 
with enforcing very particular labor laws,41 often overlapping with 
their state counterparts.  For example, the Wage and Hour Division 
(WHD) can only enforce wage and hour laws, whereas the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is limited to 
enforcing health and safety laws and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) addresses discrimination in the 
workplace.42  Instead of cross-training inspectors or consolidating 
agencies, the federal government has moved in the other direction: 
not only has the Department of Labor (DOL) further divided its 
agencies but also the Government Accountability Office has found a 
shockingly low level of interagency referrals.43 
This inspector specialization served well in the post-World War II 
economy that was marked by the rapidly growing sophistication of 
both production and management.44  U.S. inspectors grew specialized 
 
 37. See Weil, Compliance with the Minimum Wage, supra note 28, at 2 (“[T]here 
are strong reasons to believe that many employers will choose to violate minimum 
wage standards when evaluating the benefits and costs of compliance.” (citation 
omitted)); see also PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 
102 (“[T]he U.S. model is punitive and reactive in nature; it is designed to raise the 
costs of — rather than lower the need or desire for — noncompliance . . . .” 
(emphasis in original)). 
 38. See Vosko et al., supra note 32, at 259. 
 39. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 19. 
 40. States may enact their own wage and hour laws that extend greater protection 
to workers than does the FLSA — and many do just that. See Galvin, supra note 13, 
at 328–39. For a breakdown of federal agencies, see Piore & Schrank, Toward 
Managed Flexibility, supra note 34, at 5. 
 41. See BOBO supra note 1, at 112–14. 
 42. See Agencies, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/jobs/dol-sub-
agencies [https://perma.cc/B82T-23MP] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021); see also 
Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/overview 
[https://perma.cc/946W-5PAN] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021). 
 43. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 38–40. 
 44. See id. at 26. 
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in response to advancing technologies on the shop floor and in the 
corporate office.45  Under that period’s “Fordist” model of mass 
production by large employers,46 inspectors could exploit economies 
of scale despite their narrow scope, using one trip to the field to 
investigate a large number of workers in a single workplace.47  
Additionally, inspectors could rely on these large businesses’ 
infrastructure to facilitate both inspection and compliance, something 
that smaller firms often lack.48  And inspectors grew to depend on a 
higher level of employer compliance, developing a “‘symbiotic 
relationship’ between managers and regulatory officials.”49 
Specialization’s effectiveness, however, was predicated on two 
particular facets of the economy that no longer exist: firms’ large size 
and the mass industrial unionism that allowed worker representatives 
to participate in the enforcement process.50  Beginning in the mid-
twentieth century, large firms began to disaggregate and the economy 
began to “fissure,” creating a host of problems for workplace 
compliance.51  This fissuring has radically changed employment 
relationships.  Aside from an increase in the number of small firms, 
employers began to employ — with greater frequency — franchise 
networks, supply chains, subcontractors, and other temporary 
arrangements to both lower costs and limit liability under labor 
 
 45. See id. at 30. 
 46. See id. at 26. As used by economic historians and labor law scholars, 
“Fordism” can be defined as “a system of mass production combining the new 
technological innovations of the early twentieth century which accelerated the pace 
of manufacture, particularly the assembly line, with a managerial ethos encouraging 
greater efficiency in the organization of work.” See Daniel Watson, Fordism: A 
Review Essay, 60 LAB. HIST. 144, 145 (2019). 
 47. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 31. 
 48. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 555. 
 49. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 30 
(quoting Thomas Kochan & Peter Cappelli, The Transformation of the Industrial 
Relations and Personnel Function, in INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS 136 (Paul 
Osterman, ed., 1984)). 
 50. See id. at 30–33. 
 51. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD 
FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 7–19 (2014) [hereinafter 
WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE] (describing both the changes in the structure of 
the workplace over the last four decades — “[l]ike a rock with a fracture that deepens 
and spreads with time” — and the ways these changes have negatively affected 
workers and our society). 
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laws.52  This fissuring has both depressed wages and benefits and 
shielded employers from responsibility for workplace abuse.53 
In a fissured economy, the U.S. inspectorate model has broken 
down quickly.  Inspector numbers have plummeted while the number 
of workplaces has grown dramatically in the past several decades.54  
The rapid growth in both workplaces and classes of covered workers 
combined with stagnating inspection resources means that employers 
face little chance of being inspected and operated accordingly.55  In 
2012, the probability that a U.S. employer would be investigated by 
the WHD was a paltry 0.5%.56  Even in the industries most targeted 
by inspectors, the probability of inspection still did not reach 1%.57  
Despite the hiring of more inspectors during the Obama 
Administration, the number of federal wage and hour investigators 
remains lower than its number in 1980, despite a 52% increase in the 
workforce.58  From 1980 to 2015, the number of wage and hour 
violation cases WHD investigated fell by 63%.59 
Compared with its peers, the United States is marked by a very low 
percentage of inspectors per worker.60  The International Labor 
Organization (ILO) has established benchmarks for inspector 
capacity: one inspector per 10,000 workers in developed market 
economies, one per 20,000 in transition economies, and one per 
40,000 in less developed countries.61  As of 2008, the United States 
 
 52. See DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH 
STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT TO THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 9–11 
(2010) [hereinafter WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS]. 
 53. See WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra note 51, at 268–76; see also Lee 
& Smith, supra note 5, at 771–72. 
 54. Between 1980 and 2007, the number of wage and hour inspectors declined by 
31% while the labor force grew by 51%. At the 2009 staffing levels for OSHA, it 
would take the agency 133 years to inspect each workplace just once. See ANNETTE 
BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 52 (2009). By 2014, the WHD 
employed 1,100 investigators to cover 135 million workers; in 1948, for example, 
1,000 investigators covered 22.6 million workers. See Galvin, supra note 13, at 325. 
 55. See WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52, at 5–6. 
 56. See Galvin, supra note 13, at 327; WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra 
note 51, at 22 (“[T]he annual probability of a workplace receiving an investigation is 
well below 1 in 100, and in industries with deep fissuring as tiny as 1 in 1,000.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 57. See Galvin, supra note 13, at 327. For inspection probabilities in common low-
wage industries, see WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra note 51, at 217. 
 58. See Bittle & Snider, supra note 26, at 126. 
 59. See COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 5. 
 60. See INT’L LAB. OFF.,  supra note 9, at 70–71. 
 61. See David Weil, A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection, 147 INT’L LAB. 
REV. 349, 351 (2008) [hereinafter Weil, Labour Inspection]. 
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had one inspector per 75,000 workers, a ratio similar to Jamaica, 
Zambia, and Thailand.62  While troubling in any inspection regime, 
deploying insufficient inspectors in a punitive model undermines the 
primary deterrent effects that are essential to the model’s operation.63  
If, recognizing how few inspectors an agency employs, the employer 
knows with reasonable certainty that he likely will not receive an 
inspection — let alone a costly punishment — he has little motivation 
to incur compliance costs under a traditional cost-benefit analysis.64  
For the U.S. punitive model that is predicated on the threat of 
inspection and subsequent penalties, this low likelihood of inspection 
is fatal. 
The mismatch between the U.S. inspection system and the fissured 
economy goes beyond simply needing more inspectors to cover more 
employers: inspector specialization and division between agencies 
leads to severe enforcement gaps.65  Because each inspector has a 
narrow purview, the inability of agencies to collaborate and share 
information cripples enforcement efforts for “multiple labor law 
violators.”66  The consequences can be deadly.  For example, in 
contrast to most of the world, the United States has decoupled 
statutory work hours from industrial hygiene,67 meaning that the 
inspector for health and safety conditions does not monitor excessive 
work hours.  Consequently, the U.S. has failed to adequately enforce 
involuntary overtime, which has contributed to serious industrial 
accidents like the Upper Big Branch Coal mine explosion that killed 
29 miners in 2010.68  Apart from the failure to share information, 
agencies rarely engage in joint enforcement against employers who 
violate multiple laws, which allows employers to limit their liability to 
 
 62. By way of contrast, Chile and Russia had roughly one per 20,000 workers, 
Argentina and Brazil one per 25,000, and Germany one per 10,000. See ILO Comm. 
on Emp. & Soc. Pol’y, supra note 8. Some scholars, by factoring in state inspectors 
and classes of employees covered by state laws, put the number even lower, at one 
inspector per 146,000 workers. See ZACH SCHILLER & SARAH DECARLO, POL’Y 
MATTERS OHIO, INVESTIGATING WAGE THEFT: A SURVEY OF THE STATES i (2010). 
 63. See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, 
and the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMPAR. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 59, 61–62 (2005). 
 64. See id. For the original enunciation of this theory of corporate compliance 
calculations, see Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
 65. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 30–40. 
 66. See id. at 37–38. 
 67. See id. at 36–37. 
 68. See id. 
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the specific laws a certain inspector enforces.69  This failure to 
coordinate and collaborate is particularly troubling where employers 
exploit workers along multiple axes, a common practice.70 
In addition to insufficient numbers of inspectors with narrow 
mandates that do not effectively collaborate between agencies, de 
minimis monetary penalties for labor violations further erode the 
inspectorate’s enforcement capacity in the U.S. deterrence regime.71  
The maximum civil monetary penalty for a repeated or “willful” 
violation for contravention of minimum wage or overtime laws is just 
over $2,000.72  Despite these low penalties, WHD inspectors typically 
levy them in less than half the cases in which they are entitled.73  By 
way of comparison, Australia’s penalty for “[d]eliberate and 
systematic contraventions” of workplace laws is $630,000 per incident 
for companies and $126,000 for individuals.74  Additionally, the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) also limits an employee’s recovery to 
only two years of back wages — three in the case of willful 
violations.75  Of the small number of workers who successfully obtain 
monetary awards or judgments, half never actually get collected by 
victims.76 
 
 69. See id. at 37. 
 70. See, e.g., BOBO supra note 1, at 173 (quoting the director of a Chicago worker 
center: “We almost never see a wage theft case in which there isn’t also some kind of 
health and safety problem”); see also PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE 
REGULATION, supra note 16, at 38. 
 71. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 359–60 (2005). 
 72. See 29 C.F.R. § 579.1(a)(2) (2021). 
 73. See David Weil, Creating a Strategic Enforcement Approach to Address 
Wage Theft: One Academic’s Journey in Organizational Change, 60 J. INDUS. REL. 1, 
6 (2018) [hereinafter Weil, Approach to Address Wage Theft]. 
 74. See ATT’Y-GEN.’S OFF., AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, IMPROVING PROTECTIONS OF 
EMPLOYEES’ WAGES AND ENTITLEMENTS: STRENGTHENING PENALTIES FOR NON-
COMPLIANCE 6 (2019), https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-
03/strengthening-penalties-for-non-compliance-discussion-paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TW4B-FS47]. 
 75. See 29 U.S.C. § 255. 
 76. See Galvin, supra note 13, at 328; cf. Lee & Smith, supra note 5, at 770 (“As a 
result of undercapitalizing their businesses, [employers who engage in wage theft] 
may either be judgment proof should a worker want to sue for their unpaid wages, or 
they may quickly dissolve their business in the face of a worker’s legal action.” 
(citation omitted)). For a discussion of why workers cannot collect on judgments, 
such as employer tactics to liquidate and shield assets, see generally CMTY. DEV. 
PROJECT AT URB. JUST. CTR., EMP. L. UNI AT LEGAL AID SOC’Y & NAT’L CTR. FOR L. 
& ECON. JUST., EMPTY JUDGMENTS: THE WAGE COLLECTION CRISIS IN NEW YORK 
(2015). 
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Apart from low monetary penalties, WHD inspectors lack the most 
punitive tools necessary to enforce the worst actors: suspending or 
revoking licenses, closing workplaces, or demanding payment for the 
entirety of wages stolen.77  Criminal penalties are available under the 
FLSA only after the employer has been convicted once, but they are 
capped at six months in jail and $10,000.78  Criminal penalties are 
rarely, if ever, invoked.79  Even where licenses are required for 
business operation, WHD inspectors do not have the power to 
suspend or revoke these licenses.80  In the United States, only OSHA 
can close a business; the WHD lacks the independent authority to 
order an employer to do anything.81 
The United States faces additional obstacles to enforce low-wage 
sectors, particularly given the rapid decline of union representation 
in, and fissuring of, these industries.82  A high percentage of 
immigrants work in the most at-risk industries,83 like nursing homes, 
poultry processing plants, and restaurants.84  Immigrants, particularly 
those who are undocumented, may be unaware of their rights or 
hesitant to invoke them,85 which undermines an inspection system 
that depends heavily on worker-initiated complaints.86  And even 
 
 77. Outside of the “hot goods” provision as discussed below, WHD inspectors are 
limited to recovering employees’ wages, imposing monetary fines, and prohibiting 
future employer retaliation. See WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra 
note 52, at 11–14. 
 78. See 29 U.S.C. § 216. 
 79. See Galvin, supra note 13, at 328; Jeounghee Kim & Skye Allmang, Wage 
Theft in the United States: A Critical Review 11 (Rutgers Sch. of Mgmt. & Lab. 
Relations, Working Paper No. 2020-1, 2020) (“Criminal penalties are rarely used, 
even though the FLSA makes willful violations a misdemeanor punishable by up to 6 
months in jail.” (citation omitted)). 
 80. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 562 (“[L]icense revocation must be a 
meaningful possibility . . . .”). In the absence of federal-level tools, states and 
municipalities have begun to experiment with licensing schemes and other non-
monetary penalties. See Hallett, supra note 2, at 115. 
 81. See Fine, supra note 33, at 403. 
 82. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 560. 
 83. See id. at 555 (“In 2008, the foreign-born made up about 15 percent of the 
U.S. civilian labor force and more than 20 percent of the low-wage workforce.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 84. See id. at 553. 
 85. See, e.g., id. at 556; Hallett, supra note 2, at 125. 
 86. Complaint-based investigations comprise 75% of all WHD and 30% of OSHA 
investigations. See WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra note 51, at 247–48; see 
also Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law 
Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1070 (2014) (“[P]rivate 
lawsuits vastly outnumber government enforcement actions against law-breaking 
employers . . . . [G]overnment agencies depend in large part on worker complaints to 
direct their enforcement activity.” (citations omitted)). 
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where the employee knows her rights, employers often use 
sophisticated techniques to obfuscate labor law violations, especially 
wage theft.87  Small firms with fewer than 20 employees predominate 
the low-wage sector, which is the hardest-to-police sector with the 
hardest-to-protect workers.88  The explosive growth of smaller firms 
in low-wage settings not only correlates to higher violation rates but 
also undermines the traditional inspectorate design predicated on 
efficiencies of scale.89  Additionally, low-wage industries feature a 
high use of subcontracting networks, often in supply chains that allow 
lead firms to further evade liability under the FLSA and other labor 
laws.90 
The combination of declining numbers of inspectors to enforce 
more workers and worksites, narrow inspector purview, and miniscule 
penalties imposed and recovered has proven profoundly ineffective in 
enforcing labor laws in this fissured economy, particularly for low-
wage workers.91  Exactly how to remedy the problem, however, is the 
subject of significant scholarly debate. 
II. CHANGING THE EQUATION: MAKING WAGE THEFT                        
MORE EXPENSIVE 
In studying noncompliance with minimum wage laws, economists 
have long sought to quantify employers’ rational determination to pay 
sub-minimum wage rates.  In their seminal 1979 article, Orley 
Ashenfelter and Robert Smith established a formula that scholars 
continue to use to measure both the costs and benefits an employer 
expects from noncompliance.92  To simplify a complicated equation, 
 
 87. See ESTLUND, supra note 19, at 62–63 (describing tactics like forcing workers 
to arrive 15 minutes early, refusing to pay for preparatory work, and misclassification 
of workers as independent contractors, which workers may not detect easily). 
 88. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 554–55. 
 89. See id. at 555. 
 90. See id.; see also WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52, at 
9–10. “Lead firms” have shed many of the activities and services that formerly were 
accomplished by employees and instead have sought to meet these needs through 
sub-contractors, causing a host of ripple effects for both working conditions and labor 
law enforcement. See id. at 9–10. “Lead [f]irms” are “firms at the top of the industry 
structure.” See id. at 79. 
 91. See WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52, at 1. 
 92. See Orley Ashenfelter & Robert S. Smith, Compliance with the Minimum 
Wage Law, 87 J. POL. ECON. 333, 335–36 (1979). This equation includes the 
traditional, quantifiable economic considerations of a profit-maximizing employer. 
See id. There may be other “soft” costs associated with noncompliance, such as loss 
of good will or reputational risks. See, e.g., Matthew S. Johnson, Regulation by 
Shaming: Deterrence Effects of Publicizing Violations of Workplace Safety and 
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the benefits are the difference between actual pay and legal wage 
rates, and the costs are calculated by multiplying the probability of 
detection by the amount of expected damages if an employer is 
caught.93  Under this economic analysis, “employers will not comply 
with the law if the expected penalties are small either because it is 
easy to escape detection or because assessed penalties are small.”94  
So, to increase employer compliance with wage and hour laws, an 
effective remedy must make wage theft more expensive — raising the 
cost of noncompliance — by significantly increasing the likelihood of 
getting caught, elevating penalties substantially, or both. 
A. Raising Noncompliance Costs: Increasing the                        
Likelihood of Getting Caught 
Beyond the obvious step of hiring many more inspectors, scholars 
have proposed several approaches to increase the likelihood of 
catching employers.95  At the risk of oversimplification, two primary 
approaches can be classified as (1) deploying existing inspectorate 
resources more effectively and efficiently, like targeting particular 
industries or using a wider array of pedagogical and punitive tools;96 
 
Health Laws, 110 AM. ECON. REV. 1866 (2020) (discussing the use of shaming 
strategies by OSHA to improve health and safety compliance); see also Sharon 
Yadin, Regulatory Shaming, 49 ENV’T L. 407, 441 (2019) (“Research shows that 
corporations are threatened and motivated not only by the risk of classic legal 
penalties but also by informal social and economic sanctions, stemming from negative 
publicity.” (citation omitted)); Lee & Smith, supra note 5, at 812–13 (“[E]mployers 
[whose business model is built on wage theft] may be more likely deterred if there is a 
credible threat of severe penalties, such as having their business shut down or facing 
criminal charges.”). 
 93. See Ashenfelter & Smith, supra note 92, at 335–36; see also Hallett, supra 
note 2, at 103; Galvin, supra note 13, at 327. 
 94. See Ashenfelter & Smith, supra note 92, at 336. 
 95. Scholars and advocates have proposed a variety of private solutions outside 
reforming public inspectorates. For an overview of corporate codes of responsibility, 
see generally James J. Brudney, Envisioning Enforcement of Freedom of Association 
Standards in Corporate Codes: A Journey for Sinbad or Sisyphus?, 33 COMPAR. LAB. 
L. & POL’Y J. 555 (2012). Worker-driven social responsibility, another private regime 
that does not rely on public inspectorates, is a compliance system developed and 
implemented by workers. See WORKER-DRIVEN SOC. RESP. NETWORK, FACT-SHEET: 
WHAT IS WORKER-DRIVEN SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (WSR)? (2017), https://wsr-
network.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/What_is_WSR_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K4AY-BL9A]. Worker groups also engage in strategies alongside or 
outside of government enforcement. See Lee & Smith, supra note 5, at 819. 
 96. Michael Piore and Andrew Schrank argue for a “root-cause regulation” that 
allows the inspector to use wide discretion and breadth of vision to develop creative 
solutions that fit within changing business structures, all under a mechanism to 
manage discretion to avoid undesirable outcomes like bribes or unpredictable 
regulation. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 12. 
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and (2) multiplying inspector capacity by partnering with worker 
groups and other third-party actors.97 
Deploying existing inspector resources more effectively must be a 
primary concern of repairing the enforcement gap, especially in a 
fissured economy.  Scholars have coalesced around a multi-pronged 
strategy dubbed “strategic enforcement,” which encourages using a 
broader range of inspector tools in collaboration with third parties.98  
Instead of relying on complaints and interventions against isolated 
employers, strategic enforcement uses data to prioritize target 
industries and employers.99  With these targets, inspectors work 
closely with key third parties — not just worker groups but anyone 
with influence over the employer or industry — to brainstorm 
 
Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite describe a “responsive regulation” in which the 
inspectorate adapts to industry conduct and structure in both form and degrees, 
escalating interventions through an enforcement period that begins with persuasion 
and ends with license revocation. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE 
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4, 35 (1992). David Weil 
proposes “strategic enforcement” in which inspectors move away from a reactive, 
complaint-based model and toward proactive steps that engage more with networks 
of employees in order to craft a particular industry structure. See generally Weil, 
Labour Inspection, supra note 61. Similarly, the ILO proposes a “strategic 
compliance” model, in which proactive, targeted, and tailored interventions engage 
multiple stakeholders to help inspectorates maximize their limited resources in an 
ever-evolving world of work. See ILO Approach to Strategic Compliance Planning 
for Labour Inspectorates, INT’L LAB. ORG. [hereinafter ILO Approach], 
https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-administration-inspection/resources-
library/training/strategic-compliance/lang—en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/8RCM-
LLT8] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021). 
 97. See, e.g., ESTLUND, supra note 19 (arguing for co-regulation as a way of 
integrating worker groups into self-regulation movements); Andrew Elmore, 
Collaborative Enforcement, 10 NE. U.L. REV. 72 (2018) (advocating for public-
private regulatory experimentation); Fine, supra note 8 (elaborating on traditional 
cooperation between inspectors and public interest organizations). Collaboration 
with worker groups, while not common the United States, is a feature of other 
countries’ enforcement strategies. See, e.g., INT’L LAB. ORG., LABOUR 
ADMINISTRATION AND LABOUR INSPECTION, supra note 9, at 66–68 (reviewing 
country examples from Spain, South Africa, and Laos, among others). 
 98. See generally WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52; see 
also Eric Tucker et al., Carrying Little Sticks: Is There a ‘Deterrence Gap’ in 
Employment Standards Enforcement in Ontario, Canada?, 35 INT’L J. COMPAR. LAB. 
L. 1, 5 (2019). This strategy is also called “strategic compliance” on the international 
stage, especially by the ILO. See ILO Approach, supra note 96. 
 99. See Weil, Labour Inspection, supra note 61, at 372; see also Int’l Labour 
Conference, Application of International Labour Standards 2020: Report of the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions & Recommendations, 461–
62, ILC.109/III(A) (2020) (ILO). 
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creative responses to noncompliance.100  In this model, inspectors 
seek to deploy stiff penalties on top-level violators to create 
downward deterrence throughout an entire industry.101 
In the most successful U.S. example of strategic enforcement, the 
WHD’s use of the FLSA “hot cargo” or “hot goods” provision in the 
apparel industry shows how strategic enforcement can penetrate a 
supply chain and drive labor law compliance that benefits workers at 
the bottom of the chain.102  Employing this long-ignored statutory 
provision in the apparel industry, the WHD embargoes apparel goods 
that are found to have been manufactured in violation of the FLSA.103  
The WHD refuses to release the embargoed goods unless the 
manufacturer agrees to create a compliance program with its 
subcontractors, including a monitoring system operated by the 
manufacturer.104  Given the rapid turnaround expected by retailers, 
these embargo delays significantly raise the compliance costs for 
retailers and their manufacturers through lost shipments and lost 
contracts.105  Under the specter of these elevated costs, top-level firms 
are forced to collaborate with the WHD to ensure that their suppliers 
comply with the law.106  This example represents a novel tactic for an 
agency that has historically shied away from a coordinated approach 
and industry-specific training for inspectors.107  Unfortunately, the 
DOL under the Obama Administration ran into fierce opposition 
when deploying the provision in the agricultural industry.108 
 
 100. See ILO Approach, supra note 96, at 7 (These third parties “can wield 
influences that are more powerful and more sustainable than those of the labour 
inspectorate to combat particular compliance issues for specific targets.”). 
 101. See Tucker et al., supra note 98, at 5–6; see also WEIL, THE FISSURED 
WORKPLACE, supra note 51, at 222. 
 102. See Weil, Labour Inspection, supra note 61, at 370; see also Tess Hardy, Who 
Should Be Held Liable for Workplace Contraventions and on What Basis?, 29 
AUSTRALIAN J. LAB. L. 78, 99 (2016). 
 103. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1); see also WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra 
note 51, at 227 (“[The ‘hot goods’ provision] allows the Labor Department to enjoin 
the transportation, shipment, delivery, or sale across state lines of goods that have 
been produced by any employee who has not been paid the minimum wage or 
overtime compensation as required by the FLSA.”). 
 104. See Weil, Labour Inspection, supra note 61, at 370. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52, at 29–30; see 
also Hardy, supra note 102, at 100. 
 107. See Weil, Approach to Address Wage Theft, supra note 73, at 7. 
 108. The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon held that use of the “hot 
goods” provision was economically coercive where the products were perishable 
produce. See Perez v. Pan-Am. Berry Growers, LLC, 6:12-cv-1474-TC, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 5602, at *14–18 (D. Or. Jan. 15, 2014), report and recommendation 
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In addition to increasing inspector efficiency through strategic 
enforcement, academics have emphasized how sustained 
collaboration between inspectors and worker groups can multiply 
inspector capacity and increase enforcement effectiveness, 
particularly in the hardest-to-reach industries.109  Janice Fine and 
Jennifer Gordon describe a model relationship in which worker 
groups directly facilitate inspectors’ work within their industries.110  In 
such a partnership, worker groups can do outreach to employees to 
detect violations and file complaints, and they can identify leverage 
points against target employers to help inspectors fashion proactive 
strategies.111  Fine and Gordon emphasize the need for partnerships 
to be “formalized,” “sustained,” and “vigorous” — that, in order for 
them to function effectively, partnerships must not be ad hoc, 
temporary, or mere window dressings.112  Importantly, to ensure a 
formal, continuing relationship and to enable worker group 
participation, the government must fund the project adequately.113 
This model has borne fruit in both industry-specific and 
geographically-limited contexts, even with non-union worker 
groups.114  One particularly successful example is the collaboration 
between an industry-specific inspectorate — the Janitorial 
Enforcement Team (JET) of the California Division of Labor 
Standards Enforcement — and the Maintenance Cooperation Trust 
Fund (MCTF), a janitorial watchdog organization founded by a 
 
adopted, No. 6:12-cv-1474-TC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56989 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2014); 
see also Abbie Fentress Swanson, ‘Hot’ Oregon Blueberry Fight Prompts Farm Bill 
Changes, NPR (Apr. 3, 2014, 11:15 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/04/03/298537746/hot-oregon-blueberry-
fight-prompts-farm-bill-changes [https://perma.cc/7YD3-2857]. For more on the 
opposition the DOL has faced in using this provision, see generally Stephanie A. 
Koltookian, Some (Don’t) Like It Hot: The Use of the “Hot Goods” Injunction in 
Perishable Agriculture, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1841 (2015). 
 109. See supra note 97. 
 110. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 560–63 (describing the role of worker 
groups not as between employers and regulators but as facilitating the inspectors’ 
work by designing proactive strategies, facilitating worker complaints, and more). 
 111. See id. at 561–62; see also BOBO, supra note 1, at 125–27 (citing successes like 
$1.3 million in back wages collected in Houston and $1.2 million in back wages 
secured in Las Vegas through complaint programs developed between worker groups 
and the DOL). 
 112. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 561. 
 113. See ESTLUND, supra note 19, at 120 (“Formal monitoring requires staff and 
money, which are in short supply among many worker organizations other than 
unions . . . .”); see also Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 561. 
 114. For an overview of different “tripartism” strategies, see Fine, supra note 8, at 
823–26. 
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Service Employees International Union local.115  The MCTF, whose 
inspectors were longtime janitors, quadrupled the investigative 
capacity of the JET and provided state inspectors with critical 
industry knowledge.116  In assisting JET to assemble the information 
necessary to bring cases, MCTF inspectors knew to visit worksites at 
night (when janitors worked) and how to systematically reconstruct 
what workers should have been paid through detailed interviews with 
workers, a skill that state JET inspectors lacked.117  This partnership, 
according to state officials, encouraged JET inspectors to prioritize 
investigations begun by the MCTF and prompted agency attorneys to 
take a more aggressive posture.118  In four years, the partnership 
helped create administrative, civil, and criminal actions against bad 
actor employers that resulted in more than $38 million in back pay for 
janitors.119 
The strategies outlined above provide ways for the inspectorate to 
make the best use of its limited resources.  The scholars advocating 
for these tactics, however, offer them not as a substitute for drastically 
increasing inspector numbers but as a small bandage on a much 
bigger wound.120  Without such an increase in the inspectorate, these 
strategies on their own will not sufficiently increase the likelihood of 
employers getting caught.  During the 1970s, when numbers of WHD 
inspectors were at their highest,121 minimum wage compliance was 
 
 115. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 566. The MCTF is a partnership 
between “law-abiding contractors” and the California janitors’ union, SEIU Local 
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Dec. 9, 2020). 
 116. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 566; see also ESTLUND, supra note 19, at 
117–20. 
 117. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 566–67; see also MATTHEW AMENGUAL, 
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REGULATION 228 (2016). 
 118. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 567. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52, at 5 (“The 
fundamental challenge facing the WHD and most workplace regulatory agencies 
arises from limitations in resources available to them relative to the size and scope of 
U.S. workplaces covered by relevant statutes.”); see also Fine & Gordon, supra note 
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 121. During the Carter Administration, the DOL had 1,600 wage and hour 
inspectors. President Reagan cut the number to 700. See Lora Jo Foo, The 
Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening 
Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2204 (1994). 
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still estimated at 69%.122  To return to that level of inspection, the 
U.S. DOL would need to more than double the number of inspectors 
it deploys.123  The above interventions certainly allow inspectors to be 
more effective with existing resources; but to really impact employers’ 
compliance calculations by significantly increasing the likelihood of 
getting caught, Congress must commit to funding and staffing the 
inspectorate at remarkable levels.  Without such congressional action, 
the other way to impact the compliance equation is to drastically 
increase penalties.124 
B. Raising Noncompliance Costs: Increasing Penalties 
Apart from not reaching enough employers, inspectors do not have 
the tools to hold them accountable when they catch them violating 
the law.  At the federal level, fines remain appallingly low, around 
$2,000 per violation.125  Alongside this amount, the WHD has 
historically levied civil money penalties in less than half of the cases in 
which they were entitled to do so.126  Typically, the worst that an 
employer can expect for a wage theft violation is to pay the bare 
amount of the wages owed to an employee within the three-year 
statute of limitations.127  Because of its limited resources, the DOL 
“routinely settles cases on workers’ behalf for pennies on the 
dollar.”128 Additionally, the DOL lacks the capacity to revoke 
business licenses or seek the full amount of back wages beyond three 
years.129  And while criminal penalties are available for “willful” and 
 
 122. See Ashenfelter & Smith, supra note 92, at 343. 
 123. The number of inspectors increased to over one thousand during the Obama 
Administration, but “[o]n a per capita basis, the U.S. DOL would need 2,232 
investigators to have the same enforcement power as it did in 1975.” Hallett, supra 
note 2, at 122 (citation omitted). 
 124. See id. at 113 (“[T]hese two factors — enforcement and penalties — must be 
thought of in relation to each other . . . . If enforcement rates are very low then 
penalties must be very severe to reach the same result.”). 
 125. Civil monetary penalties are only available for repeat or willful violators of 
minimum wage and overtime laws, and in 2021, the penalty is $2,074. See 29 C.F.R. § 
578.3(a) (2021). The amount is adjusted annually for inflation. See Civil Money 
Penalty Inflation Adjustments, supra note 14. 
 126. See WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52, at 14; see also 
Galvin, supra note 13, at 328 (“Civil or criminal penalties are rare . . . .”). 
 127. See NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, supra note 28, at 17; see also Hallett, supra note 
2, at 109. 
 128. Hallett, supra note 2, at 109. 
 129. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 562 (calling for license revocation and 
extension or abolishment of statutes of limitation). 
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repeat offenders,130 there is little evidence they are invoked by 
inspectors.131 
In an ideal world, Congress would not only substantially increase 
the number of inspectors but also grant inspectors the tools that 
would allow them to hold accountable bad actor employers.  
Recognizing the unlikelihood of worker-friendly federal-level change, 
workers’ rights advocates have spent the last decade driving state and 
municipal reforms to increase the tools available to state-level 
inspectors, advocates, and workers.132  These reforms range from 
extending the statute of limitations and granting workers private 
rights of action to authorizing treble damages, much higher monetary 
fines, and criminal penalties.133  Scholarly analysis demonstrates that 
the laws that “most dramatically increased punitive damages saw the 
greatest declines in the incidence of minimum wage violations.”134  
While state-level efforts provide real, important benefits to workers 
in those jurisdictions, they do not address the federal-level failures 
that affect workers nationwide. 
Even absent sweeping federal change, however, tools to increase 
penalties for employer noncompliance are available throughout the 
country — but not to labor inspectors.  Prosecutors at state and 
municipal levels have access to the most punitive tools that federal 
inspectors lack: arrest, threats of jail time, seizing assets, barring 
employer access to government contracting, and more.135  They can 
pursue violations under not only labor laws but also other civil and 
criminal statutes that affect workers, like intentional misclassification, 
failure to obtain workers’ compensation insurance, health and safety 
violations, insurance fraud, financial crimes, and other creative 
approaches.136 
Some scholars and advocates in the United States have argued that 
AGs and DAs can help fill a portion of the enforcement gap, 
particularly regarding the epidemic of wage theft.137  Scholars 
 
 130. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a). 
 131. See Galvin, supra note 13, at 328. 
 132. See Lee & Smith, supra note 5, at 761. 
 133. See id. at 776. 
 134. Galvin, supra note 13, at 326. 
 135. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
 136. See Terri Gerstein & David Seligman, A Response to “Rethinking Wage 
Theft Criminalization,” ONLABOR (Apr. 20, 2018), http://www.onlabor.org/a-
response-to-rethinking-wage-theft-criminalization [https://perma.cc/Z9Z8-EWAU]. 
 137. See, e.g., Jane R. Flanagan, Alt-Enforcers: The Emergence of State Attorneys 
General as Workplace Rights Enforcers, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 108 (2020) 
(“[T]raditional wage enforcement agencies, namely state departments of labor and 
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typically approach the intervention of DAs and AGs from a place of 
resource deprivation: where the number of inspectors to workers 
remains perilously low, any other help looks good.138  In that analysis, 
AGs and DAs are complementary to labor inspectorates139 or 
“alternative or supplemental workplace rights enforcers.”140  These 
prosecutors cannot replace inspectors and their power to make 
routine inspections, use non-punitive strategies to encourage 
employer compliance, or take primary ownership over labor law 
enforcement.141 
But until federal inspectors are plentiful enough and possess the 
high-level tools necessary to hold employers accountable, AGs and 
DAs should be understood not merely as complementary but rather 
as necessary in our current inspector framework — without requiring 
any further legislative action.142  Where, at the federal level, both the 
likelihood of inspection and punishment for contravention of labor 
laws remain painfully low, the tools wielded by AGs and DAs can 
shift that equation for scofflaw employers.  With their broad purview 
to prosecute crimes143 and a host of effective tools at their disposal, 
AGs and DAs in a variety of jurisdictions have shown that they can 
hold bad actor employers accountable.144 
 
the U.S. Department of Labor, do not have the resources to adequately enforce 
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discretionary authority of the New York State Attorney General). 
 141. See GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 3. 
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 143. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 111. 
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C. How DAs and AGs Have Increased Enforcement of           
Labor Laws 
In the last 15 years, state AGs have begun to enforce labor laws.145  
As of 2020, eight states and Washington, D.C. have dedicated 
workers’ rights units within AG offices, six of which were initiated in 
the last five years.146  While many units exercise existing legal 
authority, in several states, legislatures have granted AGs general 
jurisdiction to protect workers, often concurrent with state 
departments of labor.147  These AGs have brought cases to protect 
workers across a range of abuses: from wage theft and health and 
safety violations to employee misclassification and sexual 
harassment.148  They have pursued both large national corporations 
and small employers in the underground economy.149  Some AG 
offices have institutionalized relationships with community and 
worker organizations.150 
State AGs play a complementary role to state labor departments, 
which are the primary enforcement body for state labor laws.151  
While labor departments employ investigators and have jurisdiction 
to enter and inspect workplaces, AG lawyers have the power to issue 
subpoenas and file lawsuits with a strategic focus.152  Most states allow 
AGs to bring both civil and criminal suits.153  To pursue wage theft 
violations, state AGs have achieved significant results for workers 
using both civil and criminal prosecutions.  For example, in 2019, New 
York AG James secured $450,000 for 100 home health aides who had 
been cheated out of wages and unlawfully threatened with 
deportation for complaining.154  In 2020, Washington, D.C. AG 
Racine secured $500,000 in payments from two employers who stole 
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from drywall workers and home healthcare workers.155  In Fiscal Year 
2020, Massachusetts AG Healey secured more than $12.3 million in 
restitution and penalties against employers who violated wage and 
hour laws, covering nearly 13,000 impacted employees.156 
District attorneys have also entered the labor law enforcement 
space.  The most prominent examples are the Manhattan DA and the 
Alameda County DA.157  Recently, the Queens DA and Boulder DA 
have also formed offices dedicated to workers’ rights,158 and varied 
municipalities have begun to prosecute wage theft.  Philadelphia 
recently created the Economic Crimes Unit to investigate and 
prosecute crimes against workers, hiring an experienced labor 
attorney to run the unit.159  El Paso, Texas, created a wage theft task 
force in 2011, which includes the police department, county DAs, and 
a grassroots workers’ rights non-profit.160  Taking advantage of 
legislation that closed a loophole that had allowed employers to avoid 
prosecution by paying a small amount of wages owed to a worker, the 
El Paso DA brought charges against an employer who refused to pay 
the entire $2,295 he owed to an employee.161  The employer was 
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convicted in 2015 and sentenced to a suspended prison sentence, a 
$5,000 fine, and full restitution to the employee.162  In 2019, after 
Colorado enacted an anti-wage theft statute,163 the Boulder County 
DA negotiated a plea deal with an employer who repeatedly stole 
undocumented workers’ wages and then threatened to report them to 
immigration authorities.164  In exchange for a suspended sentence, the 
employer agreed to pay restitution to the workers or else serve up to 
three years in prison.165  These cases highlight two important facets of 
DA prosecutions: they can successfully prosecute small employers 
who blatantly violate the law, and they can obtain restitution for 
workers merely by threatening jail time — and avoid the collections 
challenges facing civil plaintiffs and inspectors alike in recovering 
from employers.166 
The Alameda County DA has demonstrated how prosecutors can 
avoid these collection problems to ensure workers receive restitution.  
In one large wage theft case, 56 restaurant workers toiled 11 to 12 
hours per day, six days per week, for as little as $2 per hour with no 
overtime premium.167  The two defendant restauranteurs, upon 
hearing of the lawsuit, promptly shuttered the businesses and 
registered new companies under different owners to avoid paying 
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assets and ultimately distributed more than $1 million to the workers 
and the rest to fines and penalties.169  Notably, despite felony 
convictions, these defendants avoided jail time by paying the entire 
amount owed to workers.170 
The Manhattan DA has focused on prosecuting employers who use 
wage theft schemes among a suite of illegal practices, largely in the 
construction industry.171  In 2015, an undocumented Ecuadorean 
construction worker, Carlos Moncayo, was fatally interred when un-
reinforced excavation walls collapsed at his Manhattan worksite.172  
The general contractor was convicted at trial of manslaughter, 
criminally-negligent homicide, and reckless endangerment for the 
worker’s death.173  The maximum fine for an employer in this 
situation is a mere $10,000174 — an insignificant amount for both a 
large company and a worker’s death.175  In the course of its homicide 
investigation, however, the DA discovered that one of the contractors 
routinely failed to pay overtime to its employees in addition to 
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insurance payments.176  By securing guilty pleas for the wage theft and 
insurance fraud violations, the DA successfully obtained full 
restitution of $500,000 stolen from workers.177  The DA’s recognition 
that the same employers who expose workers to fatal health and 
safety conditions also routinely steal their wages and engage in tax 
and workers’ compensation fraud led to the formation of the 
Construction Fraud Task Force.178  Housed in the Rackets Bureau, 
which historically has prosecuted organized crime,179 the Task Force 
brings together different government agencies to identify and 
prosecute corruption in the construction industry that affects workers 
and the general public alike.180 
The Construction Fraud Task Force also organized the Wage Theft 
Initiative, a collaborative effort of DAs in New York City and 
surrounding counties as well as the New York City Comptroller, the 
New York State Department of Labor, and the New York State 
AG.181  From 2015 through 2017, the Wage Theft Initiative recovered 
more than $2.5 million in stolen wages for more than 400 workers.182  
District attorneys in New York City and neighboring counties have 
pursued wage theft by prosecuting employers under charges of grand 
larceny, offering a false instrument, criminal possession of stolen 
property, fraudulent schemes, and failure to pay prevailing wages.183 
Considering the scope of the enforcement gap, these interventions 
are minor in scale but important in practice: they exemplify how state 
and local prosecutors have used their powerful tools to enforce labor 
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laws.  They show that the tools inspectors lack — stiff fines, asset 
seizure, business closure — or too often fail to employ — criminal 
penalties — can be used by prosecutors to punish labor law violators 
and provide restitution to workers.  Even more, some DAs and AGs 
have adapted best practices of inspectorate reform by collaborating 
with worker groups and targeting particular industries. 
III. PROSECUTORS ENFORCING LABOR LAWS:                                  
CRITIQUES AND BEST PRACTICES 
Labor law enforcement by DAs and AGs is not without its 
challenges, particularly where undocumented workers are involved.  
The final Part of the Note will address both critiques of this model 
and best practices to ensure that these powerful tools are being 
leveraged safely and effectively.  In particular, this Note advocates for 
DAs and AGs to partner explicitly with worker groups and to focus 
their investigations and prosecutions in particular industries or on 
specific employer tactics.  This Note highlights these two 
interventions because, in the limited sample size of prosecutions, they 
have proven most effective.  Additionally, given the elevated risk to 
undocumented workers in engaging with law enforcement officials, 
worker groups can not only benefit the investigation and prosecution 
but also provide security for vulnerable workers who engage agents of 
the criminal justice system. 
A. Critiques of DAs and AGs Enforcing Labor Laws 
Encouraging DAs and AGs to enforce labor laws presents three 
core concerns: whether and how they can undertake this work in this 
first place, how to protect vulnerable workers from the possible 
negative consequences of engaging law enforcement, and how to 
ensure that DAs and AGs pursue workers’ interests, not simply 
punishment of employers.  Additionally, one commentator employs a 
criminal justice lens to critique, as a foundational matter, the use of 
criminal law to solve the problem of wage theft. The following 
subsection will take each of these in turn. 
A fundamental need for AGs and DAs to prosecute wage theft is 
the jurisdictional authority,184 and political will, to do so.  Some states 
have enacted laws that create criminal penalties for wage theft, 
 
 184. States give a range of criminal enforcement authority to their AGs. Some, like 
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Island, give state AGs exclusive criminal jurisdiction. Most states are somewhere in 
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explicitly empowering AGs and DAs to pursue these employers.185  In 
other jurisdictions, enforcement agents must creatively prosecute 
under fraud or theft of services laws to interrupt these employers’ 
criminal business practices.186  In 33 states, for example, criminal 
codes allow for theft of services law prosecution.187  Realistically, 
some DAs or AGs simply may not have clear paths to pursuing bad 
actor employers or may simply refuse to undertake the creative 
investigations to hold these employers accountable.  Unlike 
inspectors with a clear list of potential punishments for discrete 
violations, this model depends more heavily on the individual 
initiative and priorities of these law enforcement lawyers and the 
context in which they work.  Additionally, because many DAs and 
AGs are elected officials or are in the public eye, they are subject to 
greater political pressure than inspectors.188  This may cause shifting 
priorities and approaches as political whims change.  Some might 
attribute recent prosecutorial involvement in labor law as a political 
fad,189 but the core need for actors with their tools and purview will 
persist in the absence of profound inspectorate reforms. 
Beyond the question of jurisdiction, DAs and AGs may struggle to 
obtain the right number and types of cases.  Under the current 
enforcement regime, worker complaints are directed primarily to 
state and federal departments of labor, not to police or prosecutors.  
Consequently, interested prosecutors may not receive sufficient 
numbers of complaints to generate cases that are either appropriate 
for criminal prosecution or have the potential impact they desire.190  
Additionally, even where they may be sufficient in number, 
complaints that prosecutors receive may not represent the full scope 
of workplace problems, which arguably inhibits a systematic selection 
of cases to bring.191 
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Engaging with law enforcement presents clear risks for vulnerable 
workers, as well, particularly but not exclusively for undocumented 
workers.  Critics correctly identify this model’s dependence on 
prosecutorial discretion,192 which is cause for concern given the 
history of law enforcement intervention on the side of employers.  In 
the first half of the twentieth century, police frequently used violence 
to put down worker strikes in favor of employers, with workers left 
wounded or dead.193  More recently, the collaboration between local 
police and federal immigration authorities has led to severe 
consequences for some workers who have exercised their workplace 
rights.194  Particularly in more conservative jurisdictions, workers’ 
attempts to reclaim these rights can result in the employer calling the 
police and/or immigration authorities to intervene.195  Even if only 
local police arrive, any engagement with law enforcement has the 
very real potential to trigger adverse immigration consequences as 
severe as deportation.196 
Further, critics highlight that DAs and AGs traditionally do not 
seek to make the victim whole; rather, they pursue justice on behalf 
of society.197  This does not preclude seeking restitution for workers, 
however, as demonstrated above.198  In fact, in the criminal labor law 
prosecutions that have occurred, employers have largely avoided jail 
time by pleading guilty and making restitution payments to affected 
 
on the structural factors creating the opportunities for wage theft.”). Additionally, 
complaint-driven approaches are also inherently reactive and may not represent the 
full scope of — or even the worst — problems on the ground. See WEIL, THE 
FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra note 51, at 361. See generally Weil & Pyles, supra note 
63 (examining the workers who are most likely to complain and how that limits 
enforcement effectiveness). 
 192. See Ben Levin, Prosecutorial Power, Prisons, and the Problem with Wage 
Theft Criminalization: A Reply, ONLABOR (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.onlabor.org/
prosecutorial-power-prisons-and-the-problem-with-wage-theft-criminalization-a-
reply/ [https://perma.cc/GZ4A-KPTG]. 
 193. See generally Ahmed A. White, The Depression Era Sit-Down Strikes and 
the Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2010) (overviewing 
public and private police involvement in putting down worker strikes). 
 194. See generally Lee, supra note 186. 
 195. For stories of employers calling Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) after workers assert their rights, see REBECCA SMITH, ANA AVENDAÑO & 
JULIE MARTÍNEZ ORTEGA, ICED OUT: HOW IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT HAS 
INTERFERED WITH WORKERS’ RIGHTS 15–27 (2009). 
 196. For a discussion of the ways local police affirmatively collaborate with ICE or 
are otherwise obliged to share information with them, see generally Ingrid V. Eagly, 
Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Law 
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126 (2013). See also Lee, supra note 186. 
 197. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 103–04. 
 198. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
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workers.199  Critics argue that criminalizing employment violations 
may encourage prosecutors to seek the harshest punishment possible, 
regardless of the worker’s interest.200  In the limited sample size for 
this work, however, DAs and AGs have not ignored workers’ pleas 
for restitution in favor of stiffer jail sentences.201  On the contrary, jail 
time has largely been used as a backstop for failure to pay 
restitution.202  Instead of seeking the harshest punishments possible, 
prosecutors have deployed their tools to compel compliance in ways 
that inspectors and private litigants cannot,203 like seizing assets or 
suspending a sentence of incarceration contingent on the payment of 
full restitution. 
In contrast to critics of criminal labor law enforcement, some 
scholars argue that wage violations, in particular, should be 
prosecuted as a “serious social hazard.”204  For many, wage theft 
should be understood as real theft, even if the employee has not yet 
come into possession of the property.205  Unlike civil courts or 
government agencies, the criminal justice system is uniquely situated 
 
 199. See discussion supra Section II.C; see also CPR’s Crimes Against Workers 
Database, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, 
https://progressivereform.org/lists/incidents/ [https://perma.cc/5EKX-YYZB] (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2021). 
 200. See, e.g., Ben Levin, Rethinking Wage Theft Criminalization, ONLABOR 
(Apr. 13, 2018), http://www.onlabor.org/rethinking-wage-theft-criminalization/ 
[https://perma.cc/U7V7-YX9U]. 
 201. For a comprehensive overview of AG involvement in labor law enforcement, 
see GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 4. 
 202. See id. at 5. But see Dave Jamieson, Papa John’s Franchisee Gets Jail Time 
for Failing to Pay Full Wages, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2015), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/papa-johns-wage-theft_n_564a16e9e4b045bf3df02826 
[https://perma.cc/4DU2-9PSZ] (describing a franchisee employer’s sentence of 60 
days in jail, restitution to workers, and civil money penalties). 
 203. See Hallett, supra note 2, at 136 (“One of the problems with the current 
enforcement regime is that workers cannot be assured that they will recover their 
wages if they file a complaint.”). 
 204. See Vosko et al., supra note 32, at 259. 
 205. See Rosado Marzán, Wage Theft as Crime, supra note 2, at 303. In New York, 
for example, stealing more than $3,000 of “property” can land you in prison for up to 
seven years and a fine up to double the amount of the offender’s gain from the theft. 
See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 80.00, 155.35 (McKinney 2010). Questions exist 
whether wages are properly understood as “property” for purposes of larceny, 
because they have not yet come into the worker’s “possession.” See N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 155.00 (McKinney 2010). Even where prosecutors choose not bring larceny charges, 
other options, like theft of services, are available to prosecute employers in some 
jurisdictions. See generally Rita J. Verga, An Advocate’s Toolkit: Using Criminal 
“Theft of Service” Laws to Enforce Workers’ Right to Be Paid, 8 N.Y.C. L. REV. 283 
(2005) (outlining where and how prosecutors can use theft of service laws to pursue 
employers). 
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to issue moral condemnation for these wrongful takings.206  Apart 
from questions of enforcement efficacy, for many advocates, wage 
theft is indeed criminal behavior and should be enforced 
accordingly.207 
Additionally, some advocates argue that because wage theft harms 
not only individual employees and their families but also wider 
society, prosecutors are well-suited to pursue justice on behalf of the 
people.208  Left unchecked, this employer behavior “contributes 
to . . . a gloves-off labour market in which public decency is sacrificed 
to the drive to maximise profits at any cost.”209  The costs of wage 
theft are externalized not only to workers and their communities but 
throughout society in the form of lost tax revenue and increased 
strain on social welfare programs.210  A landmark study of wage theft 
in major U.S. cities found that failure to pay the minimum wage 
increased poverty rates among workers experiencing wage theft by 
22.9% in California and 40.6% in New York.211  For prosecutors 
seeking to enforce laws whose contravention has wide-ranging 
societal impacts, wage theft is a natural fit. 
Alongside structural concerns about how prosecutors would 
undertake this work, one criminal justice reformer has criticized 
worker advocates’ embrace of the tools of the criminal justice system 
— the same system that has decimated communities of color and 
undocumented immigrants.  In his recent article, written from his 
position as an advocate for decarceration,212  Benjamin Levin 
 
 206. See Lee, supra note 186, at 676 (“[T]he criminalization of wage theft creates 
unique opportunities to debate the moral dimensions of a labor market . . . .”). 
 207. See, e.g., Diana Florence & Catalina Cruz, Opinion: Wage Theft Is a Criminal 
Act. Treat It as Such, CITYLIMITS (July 16, 2020), 
https://citylimits.org/2020/07/16/opinion-wage-theft-is-a-criminal-act-treat-it-as-such/ 
[https://perma.cc/H24B-4J36]; Terri Gerstein, Stealing from Workers Is a Crime. Why 
Don’t More Prosecutors See It That Way?, NATION (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/stealing-from-workers-is-a-crime-why-
dont-prosecutors-see-it-that-way/ [https://perma.cc/5769-52YS]; see also Rosado 
Marzán, Wage Theft as Crime, supra note 2, at 308. 
 208. See Hatch & Gerstein, supra note 13; see also Florence & Cruz, supra note 
207. 
 209. See Vosko et al., supra note 32, at 259 (citation omitted). 
 210. See COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 8. 
 211. See id. 
 212. For more on decarceration and prison abolition, see, e.g., ANGELA DAVIS, 
ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003); Robert H. Ambrose, Note: Decarceration in a Mass 
Incarceration State: The Road to Prison Abolition, 45 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 
732 (2019); John Washington, What Is Prison Abolition?, NATION (July 31, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/what-is-prison-abolition/ 
[https://perma.cc/G3EP-G5AV]. 
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questions the effectiveness of wage theft prosecutions and cautions 
against progressive advocates’ desire to criminalize objectionable 
conduct as a policy solution.213  Levin argues that advocates’ calls to 
prosecute wage theft serve to perpetuate the existence of a criminal 
justice system.214  He also questions the theoretical legitimacy of 
criminalizing wage theft along retributive and deterrent 
justifications.215 
Levin’s critique, however, misses the mark in several key ways.  
First, Levin elides criminal prosecution and incarceration.216  In doing 
so, he fails to acknowledge that advocates have not consistently 
sought jail time as a required punishment.217  Additionally, by not 
reviewing the wage theft prosecutions that have taken place, Levin 
overlooks how employers have largely avoided incarceration by 
paying workers and penalties.218  Further, by conflating prosecution 
and incarceration, Levin fails to appreciate the distinction in tools 
available to prosecutors that both enforcement agencies and 
plaintiffs’ attorneys lack, like seizing assets or enforcing a broad array 
of workplace conduct.219  Secondly, by remaining on a purely 
theoretical plane, Levin refuses to reckon with the practical need for 
alternatives to an enforcement infrastructure that routinely fails to 
serve workers’ and society’s needs.  In so doing, Levin misses the 
thrust of advocates’ arguments: not that they would prefer that 
prosecutors pursue criminal penalties for wage theft but that 
 
 213. See generally Benjamin Levin, Wage Theft Criminalization, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1429 (2021). 
 214. See id. at 1495. 
 215. See id. at 1450 (“[I]t is not at all clear to me that retributivism requires (or 
justifies) any sort of carceral punishment for wage theft.” (citation omitted)); see also 
id. at 1459 (questioning the “assumptions” that employers are “rational actors” and 
that “prison or jail sentences are an effective way to prevent employers from stealing 
wages”). 
 216. See id. at 1462 (“By embracing an argument that caging people is an 
acceptable approach if it deters bad conduct, workers’ rights advocates have accepted 
and embraced a core component of our harshly punitive system.”). Notably, Levin 
fails to cite any advocates who argue for incarceration as a required punishment for 
successful wage theft prosecutions. Id. 
 217. See GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 4. 
 218. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
 219. See discussion supra Section II.B. In other countries, these tools are not 
restricted to prosecutors; labor inspectors have them, too. Chilean labor inspectors 
can subpoena employers, conduct mandatory conciliations, and levy heavy fines that 
compel employer compliance. See Rosado Marzán, Punishment and Work Law 
Compliance, supra note 10. French inspectors have wide-reaching abilities to examine 
any part of the employer’s operations that “deals with the applications of legal 
provisions.” See Vericel, supra note 33, at 306. In cases of wage theft, French 
inspectors can demand that employers pay wages immediately. See id. at 323. 
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prosecutors can fill some of the enforcement gap and effectively 
enforce bad actor employers where inspectors have failed.220  
Properly understood, advocates’ cries that “wage theft is a crime”221 
do not seek criminal penalties instead of a robust inspectorate 
enforcement system or even that bad actor employers should be 
incarcerated.222  Rather, when confronted with scofflaw employers 
who steal a worker’s wages combined with the sustained enforcement 
gap, advocates have developed creative approaches and sought new 
legal tools to find justice for and with exploited workers.223 
Levin’s warnings about the use of criminal tools to solve public ills 
are important to consider, given how communities of color, 
immigrants, and working-class individuals have suffered 
disproportionately from the criminal justice system.224  Along with 
other advocates, this Note, however, does not propose AG and DA 
prosecution of labor laws as a replacement for other enforcement 
regimes or as an unrestrained use of criminal justice powers.  Instead, 
prosecutors’ intervention should be configured specifically to ensure 
that workers are protected and that resources are used responsibly to 
pursue the true bad actor employers that abuse their workers. 
 
 220. Wage theft is one of many strategies bad actor employers use to exploit 
workers, and advocates have sought criminal penalties for many of them. See 
OBERNAUER, supra note 175, at 22; see also Michael Gannon, Peralta Pushing to Pass 
Carlos’ Law, QUEENS CHRON. (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.qchron.com/editions/queenswide/peralta-pushing-to-pass-carlos-
law/article_64006adc-7caa-5407-b2b1-4aa6df50c8eb.html [https://perma.cc/5E5C-
JLVR] (quoting the Executive Director of New Immigrant Community 
Empowerment, a worker center, advocating for new criminal penalties for employers 
in cases of a worker death or serious injury). 
 221. See Levin, supra note 213, at 1446. 
 222. Levin also argues that by singling out wage theft for criminal penalties, 
advocates “risk legitimating other employer behaviors and structures of economic 
inequality.” See id. at 1488 (citations omitted). Worker advocates, however, seek 
criminal penalties for a range of employer conduct. See, e.g., Gannon, supra note 220 
(health and safety); NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, EXPOSING WAGE THEFT WITHOUT 
FEAR: STATES MUST PROTECT WORKERS FROM RETALIATION 24–25 (2019), 
https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Retal-Report-6-26-19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3FVB-U294] (employer retaliation). 
 223. For examples of the range of approaches taken by advocates, including 
criminal penalties, see generally Lee & Smith, supra note 5. 
 224. See, e.g., Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/6UN3-T8UF]. 
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B. Best Practice: Collaboration with Worker Groups 
Given the above challenges and critiques, in order to both protect 
vulnerable workers and ensure successful prosecutions, DAs and 
AGs must pursue this work under specific conditions.225  Many of the 
best practices identified for inspectorate reform have been adopted 
already by some DAs and AGs who pursue this work: partnering with 
worker groups, targeting particular industries in which worker abuse 
spans a multiplicity of violations, and collaborating with other 
agencies to multiply resource efficiency. 
Collaboration with worker groups is critical to the success of DA 
and AG labor law enforcement, both to protect workers’ interests in 
the legal process and to assist prosecutors in receiving complaints and 
targeting the right employers.226  Because prosecutors cannot 
proactively inspect workplaces, they need a way to identify pressing 
issues on the ground and surface complaints from vulnerable 
workers.227  Worker groups can fill this gap.228  They can also serve as 
a buffer between workers and law enforcement,229 which is 
particularly critical where vulnerable workers are involved.  Because 
prosecutors often have little experience with labor violations and 
specific industry practices, worker groups can guide their 
investigations and secure witnesses for case development while also 
accompanying workers throughout the case.230  Additionally, worker 
 
 225. For one description of the ideal circumstances under which criminalization of 
wage theft might operate, see Rosado Marzán, Wage Theft as Crime, supra note 2, at 
310–14. 
 226. See Hatch & Gerstein, supra note 13 (“Workers’ rights enforcement requires 
extensive collaboration and partnership with civil society — worker centers, unions, 
advocacy groups — because these groups are based in communities, know conditions 
on the ground, and have the trust of workers who may be unlikely to reach out to the 
government.”). 
 227. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 116. 
 228. Janice Fine proposes partnerships with worker groups to address the 
enforcement gap by detecting violations, conducting outreach, collecting evidence, 
and convening partnerships. See Fine, supra note 8, at 825–26. For a broad 
description of worker centers, which serve and organize non-union workers 
(particularly low-wage and immigrant workers), see Héctor R. Cordero-Guzmán, 
Worker Center Networks, and the Promise of Protections for Low-Wage Workers, 18 
J. LAB. & SOC’Y 31 (2015). 
 229. See Rosado Marzán, Wage Theft as Crime, supra note 2, at 312; see also Fine 
& Gordon, supra note 10, at 561 (describing how worker groups could allow workers 
to file claims anonymously, “triggering an investigation without putting specific 
workers at risk”). 
 230. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 120; see also Fine, supra note 8, at 825; 
Alameda Cnty. Press Release, supra note 167 (“The Asian Americans Advancing 
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groups can assist in locating impacted workers in instances of large 
settlements and alert the prosecutor if the employer is violating the 
terms of the settlement or court order or otherwise has reverted to 
breaking the law.231 
This collaboration between prosecutors and worker groups should 
mirror the best practices for inspector partnerships with these 
organizations: “formalized,” “sustained,” and “vigorous.”232  As an 
example of such a configuration, the Manhattan DA has funded a 
partnership with NYC-based worker centers and other worker 
advocates, creating the Manhattan Justice for Workers Collaborative 
(MJWC).233  Along with goals of promoting outreach to immigrant 
workers and training them on their rights, the MJWC seeks to 
increase reporting of employers’ criminal activities against low-wage 
workers, particularly regarding wage theft and dangerous health and 
safety practices.234  The MJWC funding allows worker groups to 
expand their outreach and services to immigrant workers in the 
construction industry, and it increases the two-way flow of 
information between these groups and the Manhattan DA.235 
Collaboration between worker groups and DAs and AGs exists in 
many jurisdictions.  In Massachusetts, the AG partners with civil legal 
service providers and worker centers, which assist the AG in hosting 
monthly wage theft clinics in four different cities.236  To resolve the 
large wage theft case discussed above, the Alameda County DA 
worked with a community-based organization and led a joint 
investigation with state agencies.237  The New York AG recently 
partnered with a worker center in Westchester County to bring 
 
Justice-Asian Law Caucus (AAAJ-ALC) originally referred this case to local 
authorities and represented several workers who cooperated in the investigation.”). 
 231. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 120–21. 
 232. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 233. See Manhattan Justice for Workers Collaborative, N.Y. COMM. FOR 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, https://nycosh.org/initiatives/manhattan-justice-
for-workers-collaborative/ [https://perma.cc/2YM2-9ADT] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 234. See id. 
 235. E-mail from Sara Feldman, Worker & Immigr. Rts. Dir., New Immigrant 
Community Empowerment (NICE), to author (Sept. 2, 2021) (on file with author). 
 236. Partners include Boston Legal Services, the Brazilian Worker Center, Justice 
at Work, and others. See Free Wage Theft Legal Clinic, MASS. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., 
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/free-wage-theft-legal-clinic 
[https://perma.cc/DT3F-C8RB] (last visited Dec. 7, 2020); see also OFF. OF THE MASS. 
ATT’Y GEN. MAURA HEALEY, LABOR DAY REPORT 2019: PROTECTING 
MASSACHUSETTS WORKERS 10 (2019), https://www.mass.gov/doc/ags-labor-day-
report-2019/download [https://perma.cc/KAG9-BG3Z]. 
 237. See Alameda Cnty. Press Release, supra note 167. 
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criminal charges against employers who steal wages from day 
laborers.238  Through a collaboration with D.C. Jobs with Justice and 
other labor organizers, in 2020, the D.C. AG recovered $2.75 million 
from an electrical contractor for stealing wages from hundreds of 
electrical workers.239 
C. Best Practice: Targeting Particular Industries                                 
and Employer Tactics 
Similar to scholars’ proposals for maximizing inspectorate 
resources,240 DAs and AGs should target particular industries for 
focused interventions.  Concentrating prosecution efforts on 
industries with a high percentage of vulnerable workers who suffer 
from a variety of labor law violations can drive change where other 
enforcement has been insufficient, particularly where employers 
engage in a panoply of illegal behavior.241  In contrast to specialist 
U.S. inspectors who enforce a narrow set of laws, DAs and AGs have 
a broad enforcement purview that allows them to pursue a variety of 
civil and criminal violations.242  Consequently, where inspectors are 
functionally unable to address the full scope of illegal employer 
activity that harms workers, prosecutors can enforce a range of this 
scofflaw conduct within specific industries.243  Additionally, the 
 
 238. See Workers’ Advocates in Westchester Unite Against Rampant Wage Theft, 
DON BOSCO WORKERS INC. (Jan. 30, 2018), http://donboscoworkers.org/workers-
advocates-in-westchester-unite-against-rampant-wage-theft/ [https://perma.cc/3JK7-
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 239. See Natalie Delgadillo, Electrical Contractor Reaches $2.75 Million 
Settlement in D.C. Wage Theft Lawsuit, DCIST (Jan. 16, 2020, 1:44 PM), 
https://dcist.com/story/20/01/16/electrical-contractor-reaches-2-75-million-settlement-
in-d-c-wage-theft-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/26FW-G8WZ]. 
 240. See discussion of “strategic enforcement” supra Section II.A. 
 241. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 118–19 (describing industry-level 
enforcement efforts by the N.Y. and D.C. AGs). 
 242. See generally GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 5 (discussing 
the scope of civil and criminal law enforcement by state AGs for workers); Hatch & 
Gerstein, supra note 13 (describing DA prosecutions “for crimes including wage theft 
(under, for example, larceny, theft of services, or explicit wage theft statutes), payroll 
fraud, human trafficking, workplace sexual assault, and predictable and preventable 
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 243. For examples of prosecutions of employers who violate multiple laws that 
affect workers, see generally GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139. 
Employer conduct includes schemes not only to avoid paying not only wages but also 
payroll taxes, workers’ compensation premiums, and unemployment insurance taxes. 
See id. 
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industry-level focus often aligns with worker groups, who tend to 
organize workers employed in specific industries.244 
Prosecutors at the state and local level have demonstrated the 
effectiveness of focusing on either industry or particular employer 
tactics that employers use.  The Manhattan DA’s targeting of the 
construction industry shows the possibilities of prosecuting bad actor 
employers whose abusive behavior extends across different labor 
laws.245  The Massachusetts AG also targets specific industries, 
including construction, hospitality, home healthcare, and employment 
agencies.246  In the construction industry, in particular, the 
Massachusetts AG formed a multilingual Construction Site Field 
Team that collaborates with worker groups to monitor sites, ensure 
better compliance, and engage with workers.247  The D.C. AG has 
elected to focus on illegal worker misclassification for its wide-ranging 
impacts on workers and society,248 which has allowed its specialized 
attorneys to uncover and prosecute the complex schemes employers 
use to cheat workers, pay lower taxes, and undercut competitors.249 
These prosecutions are highly contextual: whether and how city 
and state prosecutors want to engage this work; which partners are 
willing to collaborate; and which industries or employer tactics are 
most pressing to enforce.  Additionally, available resources clearly 
affect the extent to which prosecutors can pursue the above strategies.  
Though not feasible in every jurisdiction, AG and DA wage theft 
prosecutions have proven effective under specific conditions.  This 
work is not without guardrails, as illustrated by both the critiques and 
limitations mentioned.  Because the criminal justice system’s 
consequences can be severe, particularly for communities of color, 
this approach must be undertaken carefully and strategically — and in 
partnership with worker groups. 
 
 244. See Cordero-Guzmán, supra note 228, at 42–44 (describing sector-based 
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 247. See id. at 4. 
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 249. See id. at 5–7. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foreseeable future, the U.S. inspectorate will remain 
hobbled: underfunded, fragmented, and unable to effectively enforce 
low-wage industries where wage theft runs rampant.  Accordingly, 
this enforcement gap — $15 billion per year in wages stolen, 
disproportionately borne by workers of color and their communities 
— will continue to detrimentally impact vulnerable workers and our 
society.  In the absence of transformative policy change to the U.S. 
inspectorate, employers will continue to exploit workers and 
otherwise avoid compliance with the law.  Just because U.S. 
inspectors lack both sufficient numbers and adequate tools to 
influence employers’ compliance decisions does not mean that 
workers should suffer the consequences of our policy choices and 
political failures.  The punitive tools to change an employer’s 
compliance equation do exist right now, just not with inspectors: stiff 
fines, asset seizure, criminal penalties, and more.  Under the right 
circumstances and while the inspectorate remains inadequate to 
enforce our labor laws, DAs and AGs can and should use these 
powerful tools to prosecute wage theft and protect vulnerable 
workers.  By following the lead of the state and local prosecutors who 
have paved the way in partnership with worker groups and by 
targeting particular industries or employer behavior, more DAs and 
AGs can help abate the epidemic of wage theft by making it much 
more costly for employers to steal from their workers. 
 
